WORKS IN PROGRESS
Dissertation (Completed January, 2021): "In Praise of Habit"
Abstract: In this interdisciplinary dissertation, I make and support the strong claim that habituation is necessary for consistent moral behavior due to the fact that human cognitive faculty does not allow for constant and consistent focus on moral matters. The moral consistency we experience requires an explanation beyond knowledge, reflection, and a dedication to doing and being good. Habituation can provide that explanation.
Dissertation chapters planned for publication:
“Habits of Morality” - The case for habit’s importance in moral decision making will be made based on current psychological research. Recent studies indicate that we are often unaware of the reasons for our own decisions. Therefore the role of habit in our in-the-moment choices may be much greater than expected.
“The Habits We Need” - In the service of definition and explanation of habitual moral practice, I will illustrate the methods and conditions in which habits are best formed and broken. Habit as a moral skill, the epistemic environment needed for moral habituation, and the contextual and environmental limitations of habit will be discussed.
“The Habits We Practice” - Culture, habit, and morality are inextricably intertwined. Societies hold many truths to be obvious, and those attitudes become defining characteristics of the culture and personal habits of the populace. People are therefore quite likely to consistently practice the morality of the culture.
“Habitual Attitudes” - Attitudes and emotional responses are often habitual, just as actions often are. Our political responses are often related to our habituated relationships with in-groups. Those responses are habituated as well, and unless the response habits are broken, no new ideas will be received.
“Empathetic Capability and Willingness” – Despite empathy being a normal human capability, empathy also requires learning. I posit that empathy requires experience and given that some experiences are impossible to share, empathetic capability requires another layer of understanding beyond basic human capacity.
“The Necessity and Badness of Othering” – Categories are very important to mental functioning and part of that function is to separate ourselves as different and separate from that which is not ourselves. The moral imperative is not to refrain from categories and separations (othering), but to refrain from equating “other” and “badness.”
“Standard English: Oppression or Liberty” – A standing question among linguists and educators in the United States is the morality of demanding that Standard English be learned by students who speak other dialects or non-standard forms of English. My contention is that within the bounds of an Ethics of Care and a preparation requirement for schools, students should learn Standard English.
